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Abstract
This study explores the e¤ects of ination on economic growth in a monetary search-
and-matching model with productive government expenditure. Our results can be
summarized as follows. When labor intensity in the production function is below a
threshold value, the economy features a unique balanced growth equilibrium in which
ination reduces economic growth. When labor intensity in the production function
is above a threshold value, the economy may feature multiple balanced growth paths.
Multiple equilibria (i.e., global indeterminacy) arise when the matching probability in
the decentralized market is su¢ ciently large. In this case, the high-growth equilib-
rium features a negative e¤ect of ination on economic growth whereas the low-growth
equilibrium features a U-shaped e¤ect of ination on growth. Furthermore, under a
su¢ ciently large matching probability in the decentralized market, both equilibria are
locally determinate, and hence, either equilibrium may emerge in the economy.
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1 Introduction
This study explores the e¤ects of ination on economic growth in a monetary search-and-
matching model with equilibrium indeterminacy. We consider a two-sector search-and-
matching model from Lagos and Wright (2005) and follow Aruoba et al. (2011) and Waller
(2011) to incorporate endogenous capital accumulation into the model. The novelty of our
study is that we allow for capital externality via productive government spending as in the
seminal study by Barro (1990) in order to generate endogenous economic growth. The re-
sulting monetary search-and-matching model with productive government spending features
equilibrium indeterminacy that is absent in the Barro model and the Lagos-Wright model.
Our results can be summarized as follows. When labor intensity in the production func-
tion is below a threshold value, the economy features a unique and determinate balanced
growth equilibrium in which an increase in the money growth rate leads to a lower growth
rate of output. Interestingly, when labor intensity in the production function is above a
threshold value, the economy either features multiple balanced growth equilibria or exhibits
no equilibrium. Multiple equilibria (i.e., global indeterminacy) arise when the matching
probability in the decentralized market is above a threshold value. When the matching
probability is above this threshold but not too large, the low-growth equilibrium is locally
determinate whereas the high-growth equilibrium is locally indeterminate and subject to
sunspot uctuations around it. When the matching probability is su¢ ciently large, both
equilibria are locally determinate. In this case, either equilibrium could emerge in the econ-
omy. When multiple equilibria are present, the high-growth equilibrium always features a
negative e¤ect of ination on economic growth whereas the low-growth equilibrium features
a U-shaped e¤ect of ination on growth.
The intuition behind the di¤erent e¤ects of ination on growth can be explained as
follows. A higher ination rate increases the cost of consumption in the decentralized market
where consumption requires the use of money as a medium of exchange. Due to this lower
demand for consumption goods in the decentralized market, individuals have less incentives
to accumulate physical capital, which is a factor input for the production of consumption
goods in the decentralized market. As a result, higher ination reduces capital accumulation
and causes a negative e¤ect on economic growth. This negative capital-accumulation e¤ect of
ination is standard in the literature. However, with the presence of productive government
spending, ination has an additional positive labor-market e¤ect on growth. When ination
reduces the demand for consumption in the decentralized market, it also shifts the demand for
consumption to the centralized market, where money is not needed for transaction purposes.
This increase in consumption causes the individuals to also want to consume more leisure
and reduces their supply of labor in the centralized market. Given that the labor demand
curve may become upward sloping in the presence of productive government spending, the
shift in labor supply in this case leads to a surprising increase in equilibrium labor input,
which in turn increases the levels of output and capital investment. At the low-growth
equilibrium, both this positive labor-market e¤ect and the negative capital-accumulation
e¤ect are present to generate a non-monotonic e¤ect of ination on economic growth in the
form of a U-shape.
This study relates to the literature on matching models of money and capital; see for
example, Shi (1999), Menner (2006), Williamson and Wright (2010), Aruoba et al. (2011),
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Bencivenga and Camera (2011) and Waller (2011). Our study di¤ers from these studies by
allowing for endogenous economic growth in the long run. Chu et al. (2014) also consider
the e¤ects of ination on endogenous economic growth in a matching model of money and
capital, but their model does not exhibit equilibrium indeterminacy. Our model features
a unique equilibrium with the same comparative static e¤ects of ination as in Chu et al.
(2014) under one parameter space but also multiple equilibria with di¤erent comparative
static e¤ects of ination under another parameter space. In other words, the analysis in this
study nests the analysis in Chu et al. (2014) as a special case.
The study also relates to the literature on ination and economic growth; see for example,
Wang and Yip (1992), Gomme (1993), Dotsey and Ireland (1996), Ho et al. (2007), Chang
et al. (2007), Chen et al. (2008) and Chu and Cozzi (2014). Some studies, such as Farmer
(1997), Itaya and Mino (2003) and Lai and Chin (2010), also explore the e¤ects of ination
on equilibrium indeterminacy.1 Studies in this literature model money demand using the
classical approaches, such as a cash-in-advance constraint, money in utility and transaction
costs, without considering search and matching. This study attempts to relate this liter-
ature to the literature on matching models of money and capital in order to highlight the
implications of random matching on growth and indeterminacy. We nd that the matching
probability in the decentralized market is a key determinant of the dynamic properties of
the multiple equilibria in which monetary policy has di¤erent e¤ects on economic growth.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 analyzes the dynamics of the model. Section 4 studies the e¤ects of ination. The nal
section concludes.
2 The model
We consider an economy that consists of a unit continuum of identical and innitely-lived
individuals in discrete time. In each period, there are economic activities in two markets:
individuals rst enter a decentralized market (hereafter DM) and then a centralized market
(hereafter CM). Following the literature, we assume that there is no discounting within each
period, while the discount factor is  2 (0; 1) between any two consecutive periods.
2.1 Individualsoptimization in the CM
In the CM, individuals consume and invest the general goods to maximize their lifetime
discounted utility. Their instantaneous utility function is represented by
ut =  lnxt   ht,
where xt is the consumption of general goods, ht is the supply of labor, and the parameters
 > 0 and  > 0 determine respectively the disutility of labor supply and the importance
of consumption. Lets denote W (mt; kt) and V (mt; kt) as the period-t value functions for
1See Benhabib and Farmer (1994, 1996) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (1997) for seminal studies on
equilibrium indeterminacy. Benhabib and Farmer (1999) provide a survey of this literature.
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individuals in the CM and the DM, respectively. For the maximization problem of individuals
in the CM, we have
W (mt; kt) = max
xt;ht;mt+1;kt+1
f lnxt   ht + V (mt+1; kt+1)g, (1)
subject to a sequence of budget constraints given by
kt+1 +
mt+1
pt
= (1   t) (wtht + rtkt) + (1  ) kt   xt + zt + mt
pt
, (2)
where pt is the price of general goods xt, wt is the real wage rate, rt is the real rental price
of capital,  t 2 (0; 1) denotes the income tax rate, kt denotes the capital stock owned by an
individual, and mt is the nominal money balance in period t. The parameter  2 (0; 1) is
the depreciation rate of capital. zt denotes a real lump-sum transfer from the government.
If we use the budget constraint to substitute ht into equation (1), then standard dynamic
optimization leads to the following rst-order conditions:

xt
=

(1   t)wt , (3)

xt
= Vk (mt+1; kt+1) , (4)

ptxt
= Vm (mt+1; kt+1) . (5)
Equation (3) represents a horizontal labor supply curve. Furthermore, equations (3) to (5)
imply that all individuals enter the DM in the next period with the same holdings of capital
and money because xt is the same across individuals, due to their quasi-linear preference, as
shown in (3). Finally, the envelope conditions are given by
Wk (mt; kt) =
 [1   + (1   t) rt]
xt
, (6)
Wm (mt; kt) =

ptxt
. (7)
2.2 Individualsoptimization in the DM
In the DM, rms do not operate, and a special good is produced and traded privately
among individuals. We denote  2 (0; 0:5) as the probability of an agent becoming a buyer.
Similarly, with probability  an agent becomes a seller, and with probability 1   2 he
is a nontrader. Following Lagos and Wright (2005), one buyer meets one seller randomly
and anonymously with a matching technology and buyers pay money in trade. Given this
matching setup, the value of entering the DM is given by
V (mt; kt) = V
b (mt; kt) + V
s (mt; kt) + (1  2)W (mt; kt) ; (8)
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where V b (mt; kt) and V s (mt; kt) are the values of being a buyer and a seller, respectively.
To analyze V b(:) and V s(:), we consider the following functional forms for the buyers
preference and the sellersproduction technology. In the DM, each buyers utility ln qbt is
increasing and concave in the consumption of special goods. Each seller produces special
goods qst by combining her capital kt and e¤ort et subject to the following Cobb-Douglas
production function:
qst = F (kt; Atet) = k

t (Atet)
1  , (9)
where the parameter  2 (0; 1) determines labor intensity 1   in production and At is the
level of labor productivity. As in the seminal study by Barro (1990), labor productivity is
determined by productive government expenditure; i.e., we assume that At = Gt. Rewriting
equation (9), we can express the utility cost of production in terms of e¤ort as
e

qst
Gt
;
kt
Gt

=

qst
Gt
1=(1 )
kt
Gt
 =(1 )
. (10)
Buyers purchase special goods qbt by spending money d
b
t , whereas sellers earn money d
s
t by
producing special goods qst . Given these terms of trade, the values of being a buyer and a
seller are respectively
V b(mt; kt) = ln q
b
t +W (mt   dbt ; kt), (11)
V s(mt; kt) =  e

qst
Gt
;
kt
Gt

+W (mt + d
s
t ; kt). (12)
Di¤erentiating (11) and (12) and substituting them into (8), we can obtain the following
envelope condition for mt:
Vm(mt; kt) = (1  2)Wm(mt; kt) + 

1
qbt
@qbt
@mt
+Wm(mt   dbt ; kt)

1  @d
b
t
@mt

(13)
+

 e1

qst
Gt
;
kt
Gt

1
Gt
@qst
@mt
+Wm(mt + d
s
t ; kt)

1 +
@dst
@mt

,
where Wm(mt; kt) = Wm(mt   dbt ; kt) = Wm(mt + dst ; kt) = =(ptxt) from (7). Similarly, we
can obtain the following envelope condition for kt:
Vk(mt; kt) = (1  2)Wk(mt; kt) + 

1
qbt
@qbt
@kt
 Wm(mt   dbt ; kt)
@dbt
@kt
+Wk(mt   dbt ; kt)

(14)
+

 e1

qst
Gt
;
kt
Gt

1
Gt
@qst
@kt
  e2

qst
Gt
;
kt
Gt

1
Gt
+Wm(mt + d
s
t ; kt)
@dst
@kt
+Wk(mt + d
s
t ; kt)

,
whereWk(mt; kt) = Wk(mt dbt ; kt) = Wk(mt+dst ; kt) =  [(1   t) rt + (1  )] =xt from (6).
To solve the marginal value of holding money (13) and capital (14), we consider a com-
petitive equilibrium with price taking as in Aruoba et al. (2011) and Waller (2011).2 Under
2We cannot consider bargaining in this model because the bargaining condition is incompatible with
endogenous growth; see Appendix A in Chu et al. (2014) for a detailed discussion.
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price taking, once buyers and sellers are matched, they both act as price takers. Given the
price ept of special goods, buyers choose qbt to maximize
V b(mt; kt) = max
qbt
[ln qbt +W (mt   eptqbt ; kt)] (15)
subject to the budget constraint
dbt = eptqbt  mt. (16)
In the DM, buyers spend all their money, so that the money constraint implies that
qbt = mt=ept. (17)
As for sellersmaximization problem in the DM, it is given by
V s(mt; kt) = max
qst

 e

qst
Gt
;
kt
Gt

+W (mt + eptqst ; kt) . (18)
Sellersoptimal supplies of special goods can be obtained from the following condition:
e1

qst
Gt
;
kt
Gt

1
Gt
= eptWm(mt + eptqst ; kt), 11  e

qst
Gt
;
kt
Gt

= 
eptqst
ptxt
, (19)
where the second equality of (19) makes use of (7) and (10).
Using (17) and (19), we can obtain @qbt=@mt = 1=ept, @dbt=@mt = 1, and @dst=@kt =ept (@qst =@kt), whereas the other partial derivatives, @qbt=@kt, @dbt=@kt, @qst =@mt and @dst=@mt,
in (13) and (14) are zero. Substituting these conditions, qbt = q
s
t = qt and (19) into (13) and
(14), we can derive the following conditions:
Vm(mt; kt) =
(1  ) 
ptxt
+
eptqt , (20)
Vk(mt; kt) =
 [(1   t) rt + (1  )]
xt
  
Gt
e2

qt
Gt
;
kt
Gt

. (21)
The intuition behind these two conditions can be explained as follows. The marginal value
of money holding is the expected gain in utility by either consuming more special goods qt in
the DM with probability  or consuming more general goods xt in the CM with probability
1 . The marginal value of capital holding is the gain in utility by consuming more general
goods xt in the CM with the after-tax net capital income (1   t) rt+1  plus the expected
gain in utility by incurring less production e¤ort as a seller in the DM with probability .3
3Recall that e2(qt=Gt; kt=Gt) < 0; see equation (10).
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2.3 Firmsoptimization in the CM
In the CM, there is a large number of identical rms. In each period, each rm produces
general goods using capital Kt and labor Ht. The production function is given by
Yx;t = K

t (AtHt)
1  , (22)
where labor productivity is determined by productive government spending as before; i.e.,
At = Gt. Taking factor prices and the governments expenditure as given, the representative
rm chooses Ht and Kt to maximize its prots. Interior solutions of the rms problem are
characterized by the rst-order conditions as follows:
rt = K
 1
t (GtHt)
1  , (23)
wt = (1  )Kt H t G1 t . (24)
In equilibrium, Kt = kt and Ht = ht.
2.4 Government
In this economy, the government plays the following two roles: it implements scal and mon-
etary policies. In each period, the governments public expenditure is nanced by imposing
an income tax on individuals. Therefore, the governments budget constraint is given by
Gt =  tYx;t. (25)
The government also issues money at an exogenously given rate at t = (mt+1   mt)=mt
to nance a lump-sum transfer that has a real value of zt = (mt+1   mt)=pt = tmt=pt.
We separate the scal and monetary components of the government in order to allow for
monetary policy independence. In other words, we do not consider the case in which the
government can use the central bank to nance its scal spending.4
2.5 Equilibrium
The equilibrium is dened as a sequence of allocations fGt; xt; ht; Yx;t; qt; dt;mt+1; kt+1g1t=0, a
sequence of prices frt; wt; pt; ~ptg1t=0 and a sequence of policies ft;  t; ztg1t=0, with the following
conditions satised in each period.
 In the CM, individuals choose fxt; ht;mt+1; kt+1g to maximize (1) subject to (2), taking
frt; wt; ptg and ft;  t; ztg as given;
 In the DM, buyers and sellers choose fqt; dtg to maximize (11) and (12) respectively,
taking f~ptg as given;
4In the case of seigniorage, higher ination would increase tax revenue for productive government spend-
ing, and hence, it would have another positive e¤ect on economic growth.
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 Firms in the CM produce fYx;tg competitively to maximize prot taking frt; wtg and
fGtg as given;
 The real aggregate consumption includes consumption in CM and DM such that
ct = (ptxt + ~ptqt) =pt;
 The real aggregate output includes output in CM and DM such that
Yt = (ptYx;t + ~ptqt) =pt;
 The capital stock accumulates through investment from general goods such that
kt+1 = Yx;t   xt  Gt + (1  ) kt;
 The government balances its budget in every period such that Gt =  tYx;t and zt =
tmt=pt:
 All markets clear in every period.
3 Equilibrium indeterminacy
In the rest of the paper, we assume stationary monetary and tax policies, i.e., t =  and
 t =  . It should be noted that the stationary money growth rate has a lower bound,
i.e.,      1, which is equivalent to a zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate.
The dynamical system can be derived as follows. First, we dene two transformed variables
t  mt= (ptxt) and 
t  xt=kt. t represents the ratio of real money balance to consumption
in the CM, whereas 
t represents the consumption-capital ratio in CM. Note that t and 
t
are both jump variables and they are stationary on a balanced growth path. From equations
(5) and (20), we obtain the recursive equation of t, which is given by
t+1 =
1 + 
(1  )t  

(1  )  f(t). (26)
Figure 1 shows that the money-consumption ratio t jumps immediately to a unique and
saddle-point stable steady-state equilibrium .
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Figure 1: Phase diagram of t
Manipulating equations (22) and (25) yields Gt =  1=kth
(1 )=
t , which is increasing in
labor ht. We then use this condition to rearrange (23) and (24) as
rt =  (ht)
(1 )= , (23a)
wt = (1  )  (1 )=kth(1 2)=t . (24a)
It is useful to note that (24a) represents the labor demand curve, which is upward sloping
if and only if  < 1=2 (i.e., labor intensity 1   > 1=2). Combining labor demand in (24a)
and labor supply in (3), we derive that the following equilibrium relationship between labor
ht and the consumption-capital ratio 
t:
ht =



(1  ) (1  )  (1 )=
=(2 1)


=(1 2)
t , (27)
which shows a positive relationship between labor ht and the consumption-capital ratio 
t
if and only if  < 1=2 (i.e., labor intensity 1   > 1=2).
Combining equations (4), (10), (19), (21), (23a) and (27), we obtain the dynamical
equation of consumption in the CM:
xt+1
xt
= 

1   + D
t+1 + t+1
t+1

, (28)
where we dene two composite parameters fD; g as follows.
D  (1  )  (1 )=



(1  ) (1  )  (1 )=
(1 )=(2 1)
> 0,
and   (1  ) = (1  2). For convenience, we plot the value of  against  in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Relationship between  and 
The resource constraint implies the following dynamics of the capital stock kt:
kt+1
kt
= D
t   
t + 1  , (29)
where we have used (22), (27) and Gt =  1=kth
(1 )=
t . Combining equations (28) and (29),
we derive the dynamics of 
t  xt=kt as follows.

t+1

t
=


1   + D
t+1 + t+1
t+1

D
t   
t + 1  
, (30)
From (26) and (30), the steady-state values of t and 
t, denoted as  and 
, are determined
by
 =

 [1 +   (1  ) ] , (31)
(1 + ) 
 = (1  )D
 + (1  ) (1  ) . (32)
We rst substitute (31) into (32) and then plot the left-hand side (LHS) and right-hand side
(RHS) of (32) in Figure 3.
Figure 3a shows that when  > 1=2 (i.e.,  < 0), there is a unique steady-state equilibrium
value of 
. In this case, an increase in  raises the steady-state equilibrium value of 
.
Intuitively, higher ination increases the cost of consumption in the DM where money is
used as a medium of exchange. Due to this lower demand for consumption in the DM,
there is less incentives to accumulate physical capital, which is factor input for production in
the DM. Furthermore, the lower demand for consumption in the DM shifts the demand for
consumption to the CM. Both these e¤ects lead to an increase in the consumption-capital
ratio 
 in the CM.
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Figure 3a: Unique equilibrium under  > 1=2
Figure 3b shows that when  < 1=2 (i.e.,  > 1) and  is su¢ ciently large, there
are two steady-state equilibrium values of 
 denoted as f
low;
highg. In this case, an
increase in  leads to an increase in 
low but a decrease in 
high. Given the two equilibria,
we have global indeterminacy. The intuition can be understood as follows. Substituting
Gt = 
1=kth
(1 )=
t into (22) yields Yx;t = 
(1 )=KtH
(1 )=
t , where (1   )= > 1 if and
only if  < 1=2 (i.e., labor intensity 1    > 1=2). When (1   )= > 1, the aggregate
production function exhibits increasing returns to scale in labor, which in turn gives rise to
an upward-sloping labor demand curve. Together with a horizontal labor supply curve from
the quasi-linear preference, global indeterminacy arises. Finally, when  < 1=2 (i.e.,  > 1)
and  is su¢ ciently small, there is no equilibrium, and we rule out this parameter space by
assumption.
Figure 3b: Multiple equilibria under  < 1=2
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In (30), the variable t jumps to its unique steady-state value  given in (31). Therefore,
equation (30) represents an autonomous one-dimensional dynamical system for 
t. Taking a
linear approximation around the steady-state equilibrium value 
 and using (32), we derive

t+1 = (1  )
 + 
t  F (
t); (33)
where   [(1  ) + (1  )D
] = f [(1  ) +  (1  )D
]g is the characteristic root of
the dynamical system. Figure 4 plots the phase diagram of the local dynamics of 
t under
 > 1=2. When  > 1=2 (i.e.,  < 0), the characteristic root  is greater than one. In this
case, Figure 4 shows that the unique steady-state equilibrium exhibits saddle-point stability;
therefore, 
t always jumps to the unique steady state.
Figure 4: Phase diagram of 
t under  > 1=2
For the case of  < 1=2 (i.e.,  > 1), it would be easier to understand the results if we
rst plot the relationship between the characteristic root  and the steady-state equilibrium
value 
. Also, it is useful to recall that  2 ( 1; 1) implies a dynamically stable (i.e., locally
indeterminate) system and that a system is dynamically unstable (i.e., locally determinate)
if  <  1 or  > 1. Figure 5 shows that the equilibrium 
low is always dynamically
unstable because 
low < 
 which implies  > 1, whereas the equilibrium 
high can be either
dynamically unstable (when 
high > 
 which implies  <  1 or  > 1) or dynamically
stable (when 
high < 
 which implies  2 ( 1; 1)).5
5We will show that 
high > 
 and also derive 
 and 
 in Appendix A.
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Figure 5: Relationship between  and 
 under  < 1=2
Recall from Figure 3b that 
high is increasing in the value of the matching parameter .
Then, Figure 6a shows that when  < 1=2 and  is not too large,6 the equilibrium 
high
is locally indeterminate (i.e., dynamically stable) because 
 < 
high < 
 whereas the
equilibrium
low is always locally determinate (i.e., dynamically unstable) because
low < 
.
When 
low is unstable and 
high is stable, 
t reaching the unstable equilibrium 
low is a
measure-zero event. In this case, the economy is subject to sunspot uctuations around the
stable equilibrium 
high.
Figure 6a: Phase diagram of 
t under
 < 1=2 and a small 
6Here we assume that  is su¢ ciently large for the presence of equilibria but not excessively large. In the
proof of Proposition 1, we explicitly derive these threshold values; see Appendix A.
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Figure 6b7 shows that when  < 1=2 and  is su¢ ciently large, the two equilibria are
both locally determinate (i.e., dynamically unstable) because 
high > 
 and 
low < 
. In
this case, it is possible for 
t to jump to either equilibrium. Therefore, unlike the case with
a small , we cannot rule out the steady-state equilibrium 
low under a su¢ ciently large .
We summarize these results in Proposition 1.
Figure 6b: Phase diagram of 
t under  < 1=2 and a large 
Proposition 1 If  > 1=2, then there exists a unique steady-state equilibrium value of 
t,
which exhibits saddle-point stability. If  < 1=2, then there exist two equilibria. One is
locally determinate and the other one is locally indeterminate under a su¢ ciently small 
whereas they are both locally determinate under a su¢ ciently large .
Proof. See Appendix A.
4 Ination and economic growth
In this section, we examine the relationship between ination and economic growth. Given
that in our analysis we treat the growth rate of money supply mt as an exogenous policy
parameter , we rst need to discuss the relationship between  and the endogenous ination
rate . Along a balanced-growth path, aggregate variables, such as output, consumption,
capital and real money balance, grow at the same long-run growth rate g. In other words,
the growth rate of mt=pt is equal to g, which in turn implies that (1 + g) = (1 + )=(1 + )
7In this gure, we draw the case in which the characteristic root at the steady-state equilibrium 
high is
 <  1. One can also draw the case of  > 1.
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because the growth rates of mt and pt are respectively  and . From the approximation
ln(1+X)  X, the relationship (1+) = (1+)=(1+g) becomes  =  g(), where the long-
run growth rate g() is a function of  as we will show below. Taking the derivative yields
@=@ = 1  g0(). Therefore, if money growth  has a negative e¤ect on economic growth
g, then it must have a positive e¤ect on ination  implying also a negative relationship
between ination and economic growth. Even if money growth  has a positive e¤ect on
economic growth g, it would still have a positive e¤ect on ination  so long as its e¤ect
on economic growth is not excessively large (i.e., g0() < 1). In this case, the positive
relationship between money growth and economic growth implies also a positive relationship
between ination and economic growth. Therefore, the relationship between money growth
and economic growth generally carries over to ination and economic growth.
Using (29), we obtain the following expression for the long-run growth rate of the econ-
omy:
g  kt+1
kt
  1 = D
t   
t   . (34)
In the case of a unique equilibrium (i.e.,  > 1=2 and  < 0), we have @g=@
 < 0. Further-
more, Figure 3a shows that @
=@ > 0. Therefore, the overall e¤ect of  on g is negative.
Intuitively, an increase in ination leads to a higher cost of money holding, which in turn
increases the cost of consumption and reduces the level of consumption in the DM. As a
result, there are less incentives to accumulate capital for production in the DM, and the
lower rate of capital accumulation leads to a lower growth rate. This result is similar to the
one in Chu et al. (2014). We summarize this result in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 If  > 1=2, then there exists a unique balanced growth equilibrium in which
a higher money growth rate  reduces economic growth.
Proof. See Appendix A.
In the case of multiple equilibria (i.e.,  < 1=2 and  > 1), it would be more transparent
if we use (28) to express the long-run growth rate of the economy as
g  xt+1
xt
  1 =  [1   + D
 + 
]  1, (35)
where  is the steady-state ratio of real money balance to consumption in the CM as shown
in (31). The ratio of real money balance to consumption in the DM is decreasing in the
growth rate of money supply, and this result can be shown as follows:
@
@
=   
 [(1 + )   (1  )]2 < 0. (36)
Intuitively, a higher money growth rate increases ination, which in turn raises the cost of
money holding. Equation (35) also shows that a larger 
 corresponds to a higher growth
rate for a given  because  is positive. Therefore, 
high corresponds to the high-growth
equilibrium ghigh whereas 
low corresponds to the low-growth equilibrium glow.
Figure 3b shows that 
high is decreasing in . Together with the result that  is also
decreasing in , we nd that the high-growth equilibrium growth rate ghigh is decreasing in
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the money growth rate . Therefore, the e¤ect of ination on growth in the high-growth
equilibrium is the same as in the unique equilibrium. However, the intuition behind these
results is di¤erent. In the case of the high-growth equilibrium, an increase in ination reduces
the consumption-capital ratio 
high in the CM, and this counterintuitive result is due to the
presence of global indeterminacy. From (34), we see that 
 has a positive e¤ect on g via
D
 (when  is positive) and a negative e¤ect on g via  
. The overall relationship between
g and 
 in (34) is a U-shaped function8 as we show in Figure 7.9 Because 
high is always
on the upward-sloping side of the U-shape, the increase in  leads to a decrease in both

high and ghigh. In this case, when ination decreases consumption in the CM, it causes
the individuals to also want to consume less leisure and raises their supply of labor in the
CM. Given that the labor demand curve is upward sloping due to productive government
spending, this shift in labor supply leads to a surprising decrease in equilibrium labor input,
which in turn reduces the levels of output and capital investment.
Figure 7: Relationship between g and 
 in (34)
when  > 1
As for 
low, it is increasing in  as shown in Figure 3b. However, glow can be either
increasing or decreasing in . Recall from (34) that g is a U-shaped function in 
 when
 > 1. Therefore, when 
low is su¢ ciently small, the increase in 
low caused by an increase
in  reduces the growth rate glow. Intuitively, higher ination reduces both consumption and
the incentives to accumulate capital for production in the DM. This lower rate of capital ac-
cumulation causes the lower growth rate. This is the standard negative capital-accumulation
8Recall that  > 1 when  < 1=2.
9In Figure 7, the equilibria f
low;
highg are determined by the intersection of g(
) in (34) and g(
) in
(35), where the latter is a monotonically increasing function in 
 when  is positive. We do not draw (35)
in Figure 7 to simplify the diagram.
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e¤ect of ination. In contrast, when 
low is su¢ ciently large, the increase in 
low caused by
an increase in  raises the growth rate glow. Intuitively, when ination increases consumption
in the CM, it causes the individuals to also want to consume more leisure and reduces their
supply of labor in the CM. Given that the labor demand curve is upward sloping due to
productive government spending, this shift in labor supply leads to a surprising increase in
equilibrium labor input, which in turn increases the levels of output and capital investment.
This is the novel positive labor-market e¤ect of ination in the presence of productive gov-
ernment spending. Finally, the overall e¤ect of  on the low-growth equilibrium growth rate
glow follows a U-shaped function.10 We summarize these results in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 If  < 1=2, then a higher money growth rate  has the following e¤ects on
economic growth: the high-growth equilibrium ghigh is decreasing in  whereas the low-growth
equilibrium glow is a U-shaped function in .
Proof. See Appendix A.
5 Conclusion
In this study, we have explored the e¤ects of ination in a monetary search-and-matching
model. A novelty of our analysis is that we introduce productive government expenditure
into the model in order to generate endogenous economic growth and equilibrium indeter-
minacy. We nd that when labor intensity is below a threshold value, the model features
a unique balanced growth equilibrium in which ination has a negative e¤ect on economic
growth as in previous studies. However, when labor intensity is above a threshold value, the
model features two balanced growth equilibria, in which the two equilibria display di¤erent
comparative statics of economic growth with respect to changes in ination. Specically, the
high-growth equilibrium features a negative e¤ect of ination on economic growth whereas
the low-growth equilibrium features a U-shaped e¤ect of ination on growth. Furthermore,
under a su¢ ciently large matching probability in the decentralized market, both equilibria
are locally determinate. Therefore, either equilibrium may emerge in the economy.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1. Equation (30) shows that the variable t jumps to its unique
steady state  given in (31). We substitute  into (30) to obtain the following autonomous
one-dimensional dynamical system for 
t:

t+1

t
=


1   + D
t+1 + 
t+1

D
t   
t + 1  
. (A1)
Taking a linear approximation around the steady-state equilibrium 
 yields

t+1 = 
 +
(1  ) + (1  )D

 [(1  ) +  (1  )D
] (
t   
) , (A2)
where we have used (32). Based on (A2), the characteristic root  of the dynamical system
can be expressed as
  (1  ) + (1  )D


 [(1  ) +  (1  )D
] . (A3)
The local stability properties of the steady state are determined by comparing the number
of the stable root with the number of predetermined variables in the dynamical system. In
(A2), there is no predetermined variable because 
t is a jump variable. As a result, the
steady-state equilibrium 
 is locally determinate when the characteristic root is unstable
(i.e., jj > 1) whereas it is locally indeterminate when the characteristic root is stable (i.e.,
jj < 1). Given these properties, we have the following results. First, if  > 1=2 (i.e.,  < 0),
then the dynamical system exists a unstable root. This result implies that 
t displays
saddle-point stability and equilibrium uniqueness as shown in Figures 3a and 4.
Second, if  < 1=2 (i.e.,  > 1), then whether the root is unstable or stable is determined
by the steady-state equilibrium value of 
. The result implies that the multiple equilibria
may emerge as shown in Figure 3b. To derive a range for the steady-state equilibrium value
of 
, we rst make use of (32) to obtain
@LHS
@

=
@RHS
@

) 
 

(1  ) (1  )
(1  ) (  1)D
1=
, (A4)
where 
 is a threshold value under which 
low < 
 and 
high > 
 as shown in Figure 8.
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Figure 8
A steady-state equilibrium 
 is dynamically stable if  2 ( 1; 1). One can manipulate
(A3) to show that  2 ( 1; 1) is equivalent to

 < 
 < 
, (A5)
where 
  f[(1 + ) (1  )] = [(1 + ) (  1)D]g1=. Therefore, a steady-state equilib-
rium 
 is locally indeterminate if 
 2 (
;
) whereas it is locally determinate if 
 < 

or 
 > 
. We can now conclude that 
low is locally determinate because 
low < 
.
However, 
high can be either locally indeterminate when 
 < 
high < 
 or it can be
locally determinate when 
high > 
.
Next, we examine how the matching probability  a¤ects the steady-state equilibrium
values of f;
g, which in turn a¤ect the dynamical properties of 
t. Di¤erentiating (31)
and (32) with respect to  yields
@
@
=
 (1 +   )
 [(1 + )   (1  )]2 > 0. (A6)
@

@
=

2
(1  ) (  1)D
   (1  ) (1  )| {z }
?

 + 
@
@

| {z }
+
. (A7)
Equation (A6) indicates that increasing  has a positive e¤ect on . Equation (A7) shows
that increasing  has an ambiguous e¤ect on 
. Specically, if and only if 
 > 
, then 

is increasing in . The result implies that an increase in  may cause 
high to change from
being locally indeterminate (i.e., 
high < 
) to being locally determinate (i.e., 
high > 
).
Finally, it can be shown that when  is su¢ ciently large (small), we must obtain 
high > 

(
high < 
). To prove this statement, we make use of (32) to obtain
(1 + ) = (1  )D
 1 + (1  ) (1  )


: (A8)
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The right-hand side (RHS) of (A8) is increasing in 
, and this result can be shown as follows:
@RHS
@

=
1

2
[(1  )(  1)D
   (1  )(1  )]| {z }
+
> 0: (A9)
Given 
high < 
, we substitute 
 into the RHS of (A8) to obtain (1 + ) <
(RHS)
=
. Based on @=@ > 0, there exists a point  so that (1+) = (RHS)
=

at  = , where
  1
22

(  1) + 2
q
[(  1)]2 + 42(  1) [1 +   ]

> 0; (A10)
  (1  )D(
) 1 + (1  )(1  )


> 1: (A11)
By analogous inference, we substitute 
 into (A8) to derive
  1
22

(	  1) + 2
q
[(	  1)]2 + 42(	  1) [1 +   ]

> 0; (A12)
	  (1  )D(
) 1 + (1  )(1  )


> 1: (A13)
As a result, if  is su¢ ciently large (i.e.,  > ), then 
high changes from being locally
indeterminate to being locally determinate. On the contrary, if  is su¢ ciently small (i.e.,
 2 (; )), then 
high exists and is locally indeterminate.
Proof of Proposition 2. Di¤erentiating (32) with respect to  and using (36) yield
@

@
=

2
(1  ) (  1)D
   (1  ) (1  )| {z }
?
 @
@|{z}
 
: (A14)
Given  > 1=2 and  < 0, we have the following results. First, there is a unique steady-state
equilibrium value of 
 which is increasing in  as reported in Figure 3a. Second, based on
(34), the growth rate is monotonically decreasing in the consumption-capital ratio in CM
(i.e., @g=@
 = D
 1   1 < 0). We make use of these results and take the di¤erentials of
(34) with respect to  to obtain
@g
@
=
@g
@
|{z}
 
 @

@|{z}
+
< 0: (A15)
Equation (A15) shows that if  > 1=2, there exists a unique balanced-growth equilibrium in
which an increase in  reduces g.
Proof of Proposition 3. Given  < 1=2 and  > 1, (A14) shows that an increase in 
leads to a decrease in 
 when 
 > 
 whereas it leads to an increase in 
 when 
 < 
.
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In other words, when  < 1=2 and  > 1, a higher  increases 
low and decreases 
high as
shown in Figure 3b. We take the di¤erentials of (35) with respect to  to obtain
@g
@
=


 +
22
2 (D
 1 + )
(1  ) (  1)D
   (1  ) (1  )

| {z }
?
 @
@|{z}
 
; (A16)
where we have used (A14). Equation (A16) shows that when 
 > 
, g is decreasing in .
In other words, the high-growth equilibrium ghigh is always decreasing in .
As for the case of 
 < 
, we substitute (32) into (A16) to derive
@g
@
=

2 (D
 1   1)
(1  ) (  1)D
   (1  ) (1  )| {z }
?
 @
@|{z}
 
: (A17)
Equation (A17) shows that when 
 < 
, a higher  has an ambiguous e¤ect on g. Specif-
ically, if 
 > 
  [1=D]1=( 1) , then an increase in  leads to an increase in g. Moreover,
given 
 < 
, the right-hand side (RHS) of (A8) is decreasing in 
, and this result can be
shown as follows:
@RHS
@

=
1

2
[(1  )(  1)D
   (1  )(1  )]| {z }
 
< 0: (A18)
Substituting 
 into the RHS of (A8) to obtain (1+) < (RHS)
=
. Given @=@ < 0,
there exists a point  so that (1 + ) = (RHS)
=
 at  = , where
  
22
 [(1  ) =+ (1  )(1  )(D)1=( 1)   1] + (1  )  1: (A19)
As a result, if  > , then we have a positive e¤ect of ination in the low-growth equilibrium
glow. On the contrary, if  < , then we have a negative e¤ect of ination in the low-growth
equilibrium glow. Therefore, the overall e¤ect of  on glow follows a U-shaped function.
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